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Abstract
This paper explores the deep-zoom properties of the
chaotic k-logistic map, in order to propose an improved
chaos-based cryptosystem. This map was shown to en-
hance the random features of the Logistic map, while at
the same time reducing the predictability about its or-
bits. We incorporate its strengths to security into a pre-
viously published cryptosystem to provide an optimal
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) as its core
operation. The result is a reliable method that does not
have the weaknesses previously reported about the orig-
inal cryptosystem.
1 Introduction
The emergence of the application of chaos theory in cryp-
tographic algorithms has caught the attention of many
researchers since the 1980s [1–13]. Chaos has two faces.
It is a deterministic system, but if correctly observed
can behave as a random one. This stochastic feature
of the chaotic systems have makes it interesting to its
use in cryptography. Because its random nature can
emerge even from relatively simple equations, chaos is
suitable to create efficient pseudo-random number gen-
erators (PRNG). Chaotic systems are sensitivity to the
initial conditions, and thus predictability is limited to
a short time window. They are mixing, and thus in-
formation about future states cannot reveal past states.
These two properties are intrinsically connected to the
random nature of chaos. They are also transitive and
have an infinitude of unstable periodic orbits, and thus
present infinitely recurrent patterns. This later prop-
erty is intrinsically linked to the deterministic nature of
chaos. Chaos-based cryptosystems explore the random
properties of chaos to secure information. However, its
deterministic nature also allows for a unique cryptoanal-
ysis that usually explores the short-term predictability
and periodicity of chaos [14, 15].
One way to turn chaotic systems into magnificent semi-
random systems would be to reduce its short-term pre-
dictability and periodicity, but without having to rely
on long-term iterates of it. This was recently achieved
by considering the deep-zoom approach to chaotic maps
[16], which consists to improve the pseudo-randomness
quality of another chaotic orbit by removing k-digits
to the right of the decimal point from each point of
the original orbit. In this manner, the emergence of
random-style patterns occurs as finer computations are
performed. Peeking into less significant digits can reveal
a never before explored pseudo-randomness properties of
chaotic systems. The patterns and the predictability of
the chaotic maps can change this behavior according to
the scale that the orbits are observed.
We consider a chaos-based method published in the
late 1990s [1], which is an interesting object of study
due to its simplicity of implementation, dissemination in
the academic community, the number of published works
presenting mainly the failures mentioned above, and that
has a proven security-failure behavior [14], thus an opti-
mal candidate to the introduction a novel approach for
security. The main flaws presented in Baptista’s work
are directly related to the statistics of the recurrent or-
bits and their predictability in the logistic map. In this
work, we maintain the essence of Baptista’s original ap-
proach, which explores the statistical feature of the orbits
recurrence to secure information. However, we use the
k-logistic map, instead of the logistic map used in the
original approach.
The cryptology field is in a continuous battle to yield
strong encryption methods (cryptography) and to find
weaknesses aiming to break these ciphers (cryptoanaly-
sis). This establishes a recurrent cycle in which novel
breakthrough cryptographic methods are being released,
and eventually, being scrutinized by cryptanalysts in or-
der to report possible flaws. We must emphasize that,
we do not aim to construct a cryptographically safe algo-
rithm but instead to focus on the theoretical study of the
proposed improvement version. This paper shows that
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the Baptista-like cryptosystem can be embedded with
the pseudo-randomness sources of the k-logistic map, as
this PRNG has shown to pass several tests that the origi-
nal system has failed. Thus, we propose a manner to im-
prove the main flaws for which an already broken method
that uses a well-known chaotic system has been depre-
cated, opening up a challenge for the scientific commu-
nity to cryptanalyze it.
In Sec. 2, we introduce the original Baptista’s method,
describing its parameters and procedures. In Sec. 3, we
introduce the logistic map and explain the deep-zoom
property of chaos, leading to the definition of the k-
logistic map. Then, in Sec. 4, we introduce our proposed
cryptosystem, followed in Sec. 5 by its cryptanalysis.
Discussions and conclusions are presented in Sec. 6.
2 Baptista’s chaos-based crypto-
graphic system
Baptista’s algorithm is one of the first digital chaos-based
cryptographic system introduced into the state-of-art [9].
This algorithm takes advantage of the ergodic property
of simple and low-dimensional logistic equation in order
to create a ciphertext.
The logistic map is a quadratic function of the form
f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] given by Eq. (1).
xn+1 = f(xn) = µxn(1− xn) , (1)
where xn ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 4], showing chaotic behavior
depending on the value of the parameter µ. This map is
used as a paradigm for nonlinear dynamical systems due
to its simplicity, speed [9], and well-known behavior and
because it is extensively applied in the areas of physics,
biology, mathematics, chemistry and others [17].
This algorithm associates each letter of the alphabet
with a ε-interval of the phase space of the logistic map.
Fig. 1a is a representation of how the phase space is di-
vided in S sites, xmin and xmax are the minimum and
maximum boundary of the phase space, and the size of
the ε-intervals depends on the parameter S, representing
the number of different letters in an alphabet one wants
to encode a message. According to the detailed proce-
dures [1], it is possible to encrypt a message so that each
letter of the message is encrypted as the number of it-
erations applied in Eq. (1). Thereby each letter is rep-
resented by an integer number of iterations performed
by the logistic equation, so the trajectory goes from an
initial condition x0 and reaches a ε-interval associated
with that letter. The sender defines these associations in
order to create a key.
The algorithm depends on the association of ε-intervals
with the letters of the alphabet, the definition of the first
initial condition, x0 and a choice of a control parameter
µ, causing a chaotic behavior in the logistic map. The
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Figure 1: Illustration of the encryption/decryption pro-
cess of the Baptista chaos-based cryptographic algorithm
[1]. a) The phase space of the logistic map is divided in
S sites, each one with size E = (xmax − xmin)/S, where
xmin and xmax are the limit ranges of the phase space
being considered. For each site an alphabet unit p is
associated. b) The encryption process describe the num-
ber of iterations N the logistic map (Eq. (1)) must iterate
until x0 achieves the p-site range, then x0 is passed to
encrypt the next plaintext unit. c) The decryption pro-
cess implies to iterate the logistic map over N iterations
and return the corresponding p-site.
ergodic property causes the event of a ε-interval being
reached by an infinite number of trajectories. For this
reason, it is considered the N -iteration sized trajectory.
It is also important to point out that a transient time
N0 will represent the minimum length that any encoding
trajectory should have.
The original algorithm was implemented using trajec-
tories with less than 65 532 iterations [1]. Even with
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this size restriction, the encrypted text can still be rep-
resented by different combinations, therefore the sender
has to choose one in a stochastic fashion. In this way,
the sender also defines a coefficient η, which represents a
probability with which the receiver/transmitter picks a
particular return as the encoding/decoding message.
The procedure given in the original paper [1] is repli-
cated in Table 1. It exemplifies the encryption of the
word “hi”. The parameters are µ = 3.8, S = 256,
ε = 0.00234375, and the limits of the attractor are
xmin = 0.2 and xmax = 0.8. The transient time is
N0 = 250 and the coefficient is η = 0. The alpha-
bet with S = 256 letters, accordingly, it is defined 256
ε-intervals. It considers trajectories that have lengths
smaller or equal to 65 532, but that are larger than
N0, which is sufficient to allow that a typical point of
a -interval of the order of 1/256 reaches out any other
equally-sized -interval several times. This can be guar-
anteed knowing that for any two arbitrary  intervals of
the logistic map, the shortest time for a trajectory point
to leave an interval and arrive at another one can be esti-
mated by the Lyapunov time, and given by −1/λ log ().
The coefficient η also represents the probability for the
transmitter to adapt the length of a trajectory visiting
the desired interval as the ciphertext.
The encryption procedure is a one-by-one transfor-
mation as shown in Fig. 1b, i.e., the initial condition
changes for each unit (letter) of the plaintext P1 =“h”
and P2 =“i”, which are the ASCII letters associated to
the split units 104 and 105, respectively. In this way, if
C1 is the first unit of the ciphertext, and C2 would be the
second unit of the ciphertext, it was generated by the x0
defined by the transmitter. In order to generate the third
unit, C2 is used as a new initial condition. Therefore, the
message sent is C1 = 1713 and C2 = 364.
As seen in Fig. 1c, the receiver may decrypt the
message since the ciphertext indicates how many times
Eq. (1) has to be iterated in order to find the corre-
sponding letter. Following the previous examples shown
in Table 2, the logistic equation must be iterated 1713
times. The result is the value of x associated with the
interval 104, the interval that represents the letter “h”.
This new value of x is considered as x0 for the next step,
the receiver iterates the logistic map equation 364 times,
reaching the interval 105, used to represent the letter “i”.
Table 1: Encryption procedure of the ergodicity chaos-
based algorithm. From left to right the plaintext “hi”
associated to their corresponding site number based on
an initial condition x0, which is iterated over x time steps
until returns a ciphertext Cn.
Plain x0 xn Site Cn
“h” 0.23232300000000 0.44160905447136 104 1713
“i” 0.44160905447136 0.44486572362642 105 364
Table 2: Decryption procedure of the ergodicity chaos-
based algorithm.
Cn x0 xn Site Plain
1713 0.23232300000000 0.44160905447136 104 “h”
364 0.44160905447136 0.44486572362642 105 “i”
3 The logistic map as a source of
randomness
3.1 Logistic map
Even when the logistic map is considered as a source of
randomness for some chaos-based PRNGs [18–21], its er-
godicity introduce some weaknesses to the PRNGs that
are based on it [14, 15]. These limitations can be sum-
marized in four main points:
i Undesirable statistical features, e.g. non-uniform dis-
tribution;
ii Predictability, that is a consequence of a return time
with memory;
iii Periodicity, which is inherent to chaos but that be-
come an enhanced problem when dealing with finite
numerical precision. Trajectories that should lead to
long periodic cycles turn into short cycles [15], conse-
quence of the dynamical degradation of digital chaos
[22];
iv The quality of the pseudo-random sequence gener-
ated by a chaotic orbit. These weaknesses of chaos
generated by the logistic map in the context of cryp-
tography have been exposed in [14, 15].
There is an additional feature of chaos that is unde-
sirable for cryptography, and that can also reflect on the
characteristics of return times, so important for the Bap-
tista’s approach. The probability density of trajectories
is typically not uniform. In Fig. 2(a), we show a bifurca-
tion diagram for the parameter µ ∈ [3.6, 4]. In this figure
the colors represent the density with which points fall in
a compartment. In Fig. 2(b) it is shown the frequency
distribution of the logistic map using two parameters
µ = 3.8 and µ = 4 (corresponding to the rightmost region
of the bifurcation diagram). Focusing on the parameter
µ = 4, it can be observed that the frequency distribution
has a classical “U” pattern. This frequency distribution
diagram follows the invariant probability density func-
tion of the logistic map [23] given by
ρ(x) =
1
pi
√
x(1− x) . (2)
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Figure 2: a) Colored bifurcation diagram of the logistic map (Eq. (1)) depicted µ ∈ [3.6, 4] in the x-axis, while
the possible long-term values is shown in the y-axis, starting from the same initial condition, calculated over 105
iterations (first 200-th are the transient). b) Frequency distribution curve of the logistic map using µ = 3.8 and
µ = 4, left and right, respectively. The x-axis shows the x ∈ [0, 1] (500 bins) and the y-axis shows the frequency
of the 104 values discarding the first 103 transient values. The curve represent the mean and standard deviation
(shaded error bar) for sequences generated over 100 random initial conditions.
In this particular case, a higher frequency can be ob-
served at the edges x→ 0 and x→ 1 than in the central
region. This map, if not properly encoded, could gener-
ate a PRNGs with non-uniform probabilities. In the case
of the chaos ergodicity-based algorithm, the probability
distribution of return times is not a plateau distribu-
tion as desired [14]. Moreover, returns composing the
cyphertext might have their average value inversely pro-
portional to the invariant measure (given by
∫
x∈ ρ(x)dx)
of the interval  being used to constructed the return
times (Kac’s lemma) [1]. This would allow the identifi-
cation of the control parameter being used to generate
returns, leading to at least partial determination of the
encoding sequence [14].
The issues of the logistic map as source of randomness
are related to the deterministic nature of the chaotic or-
bits and its ergodicity. In order for the logistic map to
be appropriately used to generate random sequences, an
additional analysis must be done. The weaknesses men-
tioned above are evident because the algorithms that use
the numbers generated by the logistic map do not take
into consideration all the infinitely long less significant
digits of orbit points of the chaotic trajectories, these
digits have infinitesimal depth [16].
3.2 k-logistic map: the deep-zoom ap-
proach
The concept of deep-zoom into chaos was recently intro-
duced by Machicao & Bruno [16]. It was shown that
the dismissed digits after the decimal point can be ad-
vantageously used to improve the randomness quality
of chaotic systems. This algorithm removes the first k-
digits of the fractional part of each point of an orbit in
order to compose a new orbit coming from an original
orbit of a chaotic system. For instance, the k-logistic
map is formed by considering the k-right digits of each
xt value from an underlying orbit k = 0 (generated orig-
4
inally by the logistic map).
Given an orbit O(µ, x0) = {x0, x1, . . . , xt} as a series
of points obtained from the logistic map, Eq. (1), with
parameters µ and x0. The k-logistic map is defined as
a function given by Eq. (3) of the form φk(xt) : [0, 1] →
]0, 1[. Observe that the domain of the k-logistic map
phase-space is ]0, 1[. This function generates orbits on
the form Ok(µ, x0) = {xk0 , xk1 , . . . , xkt }, that is the result-
ing orbit derived from an underlying orbit O(µ, x0). The
new values xkt are formed by retaining k-th decimals to
the right of the decimal separator corresponding to the
underlying point xt ∈ Ok=0, a transformation that can
be represented by
xkt = φk(xt) = xt10
k − bxt10kc , (3)
where b c stands for the floor function, and x0 ∈]0, 1[.
Machicao & Bruno [16] recommended to use µ→ 4, since
the closer µ is to 4, the less dense are the periodic win-
dows, and therefore, a parameter taken by chance has
a larger positive probability of generating a chaotic or-
bit. To illustrate an output of Eq. (3), observe two
values generated by the logistic map: xt = 0.581234
and xt+1 = 0.523674185238 corresponding to an orbit
using µ = 4. To generate a k-logistic map orbit with
k = 1, indicates to discard the first position of the dec-
imal places of xt, i.e. φk=1(xt) = 0.81234, and analo-
gously φk=3(xt+1) = 0.6744185238.
From Fig. 3 an interesting phenomenon can be ob-
served when comparing the original bifurcation diagram
of the logistic map shown in Fig. 2(a) with the bifurcation
diagrams of the k-logistic map with k = 1, k = 2, and
k = 3. It is observed that the chaotic patterns interleaved
predominantly in the µ ∈ [3.57, 3.828] and µ ∈ [3.86, 4]
regions and that follow a zigzag pattern (k = 1) begin to
disappear gradually as k is enlarged. No apparent pat-
tern for the trajectory’s probability distribution is ob-
served for k = 3. In fact, the distribution frequency
of the k-logistic map becomes rapidly uniform, even for
moderately large k (see Figs. 4(b-d)).
4 Proposed chaos-based crypto-
graphic system
The deep-zoom approach has shown interesting results.
In fact, it was shown that the randomness quality is im-
proved as k is increased, because of its rapid transition
to “strong” randomness as k tends to infinity, which was
demonstrated throughout a set of empirical tests [16].
Therefore, what would happen when the logistic map
of the Baptista’s algorithm is replaced by the k-logistic
map?
Recall the block diagrams shown in Fig. 1 where the
function f(xn) inside the encryption/decryption blocks
corresponds to Eq. (1). Our proposed cryptosystem sim-
ply embed the k-logistic map function φk(xn) given by
Eq. (3) into the original approach. In fact, one could
embed almost any chaotic function to generate returns.
For the purposes of comparison, we will also consider in
Sec. 5 a general PRNG to extract first returns. Notice
however that chaotic functions are usually advantageous
in contrast to general PRNGs, since they usually require
less computational power and are quicker to be imple-
mented.
In order to exemplify the encryption process using the
k-logistic map, we consider the message “hi”, as shown
in our previous example of Section 2, and same parame-
ters µ = 3.8, N0 = 250 transient, x0 = 0.232323, η = 0.
These ciphertexts are reported in Table 3 for each pa-
rameter k = 0 (original logistic map), k = 1, k = 2,
k = 3 and k = 4.
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Figure 3: Colored bifurcation diagrams of the k-logistic
map (Eq. (3)) for k = 1 (upper panel), k = 2 (mid-
dle panel) and k = 3 (lower panel), from top to down.
The x-axis depicts µ ∈ [3.6, 4], while the y-axis shows
the k-logistic map, starting from the same initial condi-
tion, calculated over 105 iterations (first 200-th are the
transient).
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Table 3: Encryption procedure of the ergodicity chaos-
based algorithm using the k-logistic map from top to
down k = 0, k = 1, k = 2 and k = 3. From left to right
the plaintext “hi” associated to their corresponding site
number based on an initial condition x0, which is iterated
over x time steps until returns a ciphertext Cn.
k Plain x0 xn Site Cn
k = 0
“h” 0.23232300000000 0.44160905447136 104 1713
“i” 0.44160905447136 0.44486572362642 105 364
k = 1
“h” 0.23232300000000 0.44194259087588 104 529
“i” 0.44194259087588 0.44472392303434 105 573
k = 2
“h” 0.23232300000000 0.44306123881144 104 609
“i” 0.44306123881144 0.44499232862576 105 1671
k = 3
“h” 0.23232300000000 0.44192450305195 104 1361
“i” 0.44192450305195 0.44586158032371 105 892
k = 4
“h” 0.23232300000000 0.44174262765409 104 592
“i” 0.44174262765409 0.44401200078573 105 399
5 Analyzing the cryptographic
quality
We now analyze the quality of the proposed method
based on identified weaknesses of the Baptista algorithm.
This section is dedicated to analyse the good properties
of the k-logistic map, with respect to its frequency distri-
bution, the frequency distribution of its ciphertext, the
strong non-invertible property of its return-map, and its
pseudo-randomness properties.
5.1 Uniform probability distribution
function
In order to avoid an attacker to make predictions about
the plaintext, the distribution of the points of an orbit of
a chaotic function is expected to be uniform. In the origi-
nal chaos based algorithm, the relevant distribution is the
one from the return times, which however depends on the
properties of the distribution of the chaotic trajectory.
As can be seen in Fig. 4(a), the probability distribution
function of the logistic map is not uniform. However, as
the logistic map is analyzed into the deep-zoom, the dis-
tribution tends to become increasingly uniform, as can
be observed in Figs. 4(b-d), for k = 1 (green), k = 2
(blue) and k = 3 (red), respectively. Figure 4(e) shows
these densities for a region as x approaches to zero. We
see that the k-logistic map resolves security issues that
would emerge as a consequence of the non-uniformity of
the distribution.
Thus, the k-logistic map resolves the weakness (i),
about undesirable statistics of the chaotic sequence.
5.2 Ciphertext distribution
Here, we analyze the frequency distribution of the re-
turn times (ciphertext) used to encrypt a plaintext. We
performed an experiment to compare the distribution
from the original method and the proposed improved
(a)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
100
200
300
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
100
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
100
0
50
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0 0.006 0.030.012 0.018 0.024
0
20
40
60
80
100
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(b)
(c)
(e)
(d)
k=0
k=1
k=2
k=3
k=0
k=1
k=2
k=3
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
Figure 4: Frequency distribution curves for (a) the orig-
inal logistic map, (b) k = 1, (c) k = 2 and (d) k = 3
using µ = 4. The horizontal axis shows the x ∈ [0, 1]
(500 bins) and the vertical axis shows the frequency of
the 104 values discarding the first 103 transient values.
The curves represent the mean and standard deviation
(shaded error bar) for sequences generated over 100 ran-
dom initial conditions. e) The inset plot depicts a zoom
on the windows x ∈ [0, 0.03] for these 4 plots.
method with the k-logistic map k = {1, 2, . . . , 9}. More-
over, we also considered to explore the characteristics of
the ciphertexts using a commercial PRNG, the Mersenne
Twister PRNG [24, 25] and a true random source [26]
sequences of numbers converted from the atmospheric
noise that were download from [26], as the generators of
the return times in the encryption/decryption method,
instead of using the logistic map.
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Figure 5: (a) Average ciphertext distribution for the original method (k = 0), the k-logistic map with different pa-
rameters k = {1, 2, . . . , 9}, the Mersenne Twister PRNG (identified by “MT” in figure legend) and true randomness
sources from atmospheric noise (identified by “TR” in figure legend). The x-axis shows a logarithmic scale of the
number of iterations (ciphertext) used to encrypt each of the 104 random letters. The average curve was calculated
over 100 randomly chosen plaintexts. The gray region correspond to the transient time N0 = 250 iterations. The
inset figure depicts a small region from the figure. (b) Boxplot of the total number of iterations corresponding to
the 100 plaintexts samples.
In this experiment we encrypted 100 randomly cho-
sen plaintexts containing 104 letters using the proposed
method with the k-logistic map k = {1, 2, . . . , 9} and
with the original logistic map. The average frequency
distribution of the ciphertexts is shown in Fig. 5(a). The
average is calculated considering 100 different plaintexts.
From this figure, we can observed that the curves for
the proposed method tend to get close to the true ran-
domness curve as k increases. Moreover, in Fig. 5(b),
it is shown a boxplot figure corresponding to the accu-
mulative number of iterations corresponding to the 100
ciphertexts. From this figure, we can observe that the
bigger k is, the shorter the time-series required to en-
crypt. Thus, the larger k is, the less computational cost
required. Moreover, our method has a better distribu-
tion as compared to that of the commercial counterpart
Mersenne Twister.
Thus, the k-logistic map resolves the weakness (i),
about undesirable statistics of the cyphertext.
5.3 Shuffling return map
When the return map of the logistic map is plotted it
is noticed the well-known inverted parabola function, as
can be seen in the upper left panel in Fig. 6, for k = 0.
Its 3D visualization in the upper right panel also rev-
els its standard continuous pattern, describing a strong
correlation between past and future iterates. Maps that
generate distinct pattern on the return map can lead to
information about the ciphertext. It is to be expected
that a return map of uncorrelated sequences (e.g. as
those generated by PRNGs) would densely populate the
space, in a demonstration that the lost of correlation.
The k-logistic map destroys these typical patterns.
The classical inverted parabola disappears when k = 1
(second row in Fig. 6), producing a set of discontinuous
curves, producing a large number of period-1 orbits. As
k increases, the points are scattered in the phase diagram
and any visual pattern seems to disappear as can be seen
in the diagrams for k = 2 (third row panels) to k = 4
(lower row panels). As k increases, the phase diagram
tends to look like more of one produced by uncorrelated
sources, with a map that is highly discontinuous and also
highly non-invertible.
So, the use of the k-logistic map should ensure an
increase in the security level of the proposed ergodic
cryptosystem, since it produces trajectories that can
be hardly predictable, this contributing to resolve the
weakness (ii) of the logistic map to the ergodic cryp-
tosystem. It also handles well the problem of long peri-
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Figure 6: Phase diagrams for the k = 0, k = 1, k = 2,
k = 3 and k = 4-logistic map using µ = 4. Two- and
three-dimensional diagrams are shown in the left and
right columns, respectively. The horizontal and verti-
cal axes show the phase space of xkt against x
k
t+1. Each
orbit contains 104 points starting from random initial
conditions, where the first 200 iterations were discarded
(transient time).
odic orbits (weakness iii) being turned into lower cy-
cles, by actually creating an infinitude of lower periodic
cycles.
5.4 Succeed pseudo-randomness tests
A final weakness of the ergodic cryptosystem regards
the pseudo-random quality of the chaotic trajectory
(weakness (iv)). Here, we cryptanalyse the chaotic se-
quences generated by the k-logistic map to show that this
weakness would be resolved by the use of the k-logistic
map in the ergodic cypher.
Despite the extensive use of PRNGs in business and in
scientific research, there is a lack of manners to analyze
the randomness quality of the cryptographic methods.
What is commonly used today to measure and test the
pseudo-random sequences are the statistical test suites.
The scientific literature highlights two of them: NIST
and DIEHARD. The objectives of these tests are to ana-
lyze whether the sequences generated by PRNGs present
patterns or any regular behavior. These statistical tests
are limited in gathering evidence that the PRNG gen-
erated numbers are indeed from a truly random source.
However, they are a first estimation, which we will adopt
in this work.
In order to ascertain that, Table 4 and Table 5 are
reproduced from the original work [16]. Generally, em-
pirical tests are addressed for PRNGs in order to analyze
the mathematical properties of the sequences. The tests
were performed in the DIEHARD [27] and NIST [28] test
suites. These tests formulate hypotheses to verify if the
distribution of the random sequence of entry is adhered
to some known distribution.
Here we propose to evaluate the quality of the random
source of the ergodic cryptographic system, which boils
down to evaluating the k-logistic map for several values
of the k parameter. Thus, 100 files were generated, each
containing 28 × 105 (12.5 MB) numbers generated for
each k = {0, 1, . . . , 9}. Note that the file size used is due
to the constraints of DIEHARD [27] itself. Each sample
was generated from a random seed, and each value xkt of
each orbit was transformed into integers using a 32-bit
mask (discretization).
The results of the 18 statistical tests are reported in
Table 4 for the DIEHARD suit and in Table 5 for the
NIST suit. Each column corresponds to the number of
files that passed the sub-tests. In both tables, the tests
that failed in at least 50 files were highlighted in gray,
which can be observed in the case of k = 0, k = 1,
k = 2 and k = 3-logistic map. As expected, k = 0 fails
to both DIEHARD and NIST. The panorama changes
as the parameter k increases. The k-logistic map passes
on all of the tests from DIEHARD and NIST when k ≥
4. Accordingly, the ergodic cypher should not present
weakness with respect to the pseudo-random nature of
the source, in this case the k-logistic map.
8
Table 4: Average number of files that passed DIEHARD tests using the k-logistic map PRNG (Eq. (3)) from 100
file samples. Severely failed tests are shown in gray. All tests passed using the interval 0.0001 < p-value < 0.9999.
Reproduced from [16].
DIEHARD tests k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k = 9
BirthdaySpacings [KS] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
OverlappingPermutations 99 97 98 95 98 96 98 98 99 100
Ranks31x31 matrices 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Ranks32x32 matrices 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Ranks6x8 matrices [KS] 0 0 25 99 100 100 100 100 100 100
Monkey20bitsWords [KS] 0 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
OPSO [KS] 98 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
OQSO [KS] 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
DNA [KS] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Count1sStream 0 0 0 98 100 100 100 100 100 100
Count1sSpecific [KS] 0 0 0 0 94 100 100 100 100 100
ParkingLot [KS] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
MinimumDistance [KS] 96 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 100
RandomSpheres [KS] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Squeeze [KS] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
OverlappingSums [KS] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Runs (up) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Runs (down) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Craps (wins) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Craps (throws/game) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 5: Number of files that passed the NIST test suites
[28] for the k-logistic map. Failed tests are shown in gray.
All the tests passed to the α = 0.01 significance level.
Reproduced from [16].
NIST test k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k = 9
Frequency 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
BlockFrequency (m = 128) 0 1 66 95 98 98 99 100 99 99
CumulativeSums
Forward sums 97 98 99 99 98 99 99 99 99 99
Reverse sums 97 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Runs 0 0 14 91 98 99 99 99 99 100
LongestRun 0 0 15 89 98 99 98 100 99 99
Rank 99 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
FFT 77 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Non-overlappingTemplate
000000001 0 0 48 97 99 99 99 100 99 99
000000011 0 3 87 98 99 99 99 99 99 99
000000101 0 41 94 98 98 99 99 99 98 99
OverlappingTemplate 0 0 11 93 98 99 98 99 99 99
Universal 0 68 97 98 99 99 99 99 99 99
ApproxEntropy (m = 10) 0 0 64 98 99 99 99 100 99 99
RandomExcursions
x = -4 90 98 99 99 98 99 99 99 99 100
x = -3 91 97 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
x = -2 94 99 98 99 99 98 99 99 99 99
x = -1 95 99 99 98 99 99 99 99 99 100
RandExcursVar
x = -9 99 100 99 99 100 99 99 99 99 100
x = -8 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 100
x = -7 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 100
x = -6 100 99 99 99 99 99 98 99 99 99
x = -5 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
x = -4 99 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
x = -3 99 100 99 98 99 99 99 99 99 99
x = -2 99 99 99 98 99 99 99 100 99 99
x = -1 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Serial (m = 16)
Serial 1 0 1 82 96 98 99 99 98 99 99
Serial 2 10 81 95 98 98 99 99 99 98 99
LinearComplexity (M = 500) 99 98 99 99 99 99 99 98 99 99
6 Discussions and conclusion
This paper analyzed a classic algorithm published in 1998
in a more sophisticated way. The original algorithm has
been much criticized in the literature, due to both its
computational cost and its theoretical weaknesses. In
this paper, we study a cryptosystem based on Baptista’s
original ergodic cryptosystem algorithm, but that uses
a chaotic trajectory that is created by the deep-zoom
k-logistic map. This paper is not intended at construct-
ing a cryptographically safe algorithm, but instead to
comprehensively study how the security of the ergodic
cryptosystem would be enhanced if embedded with the
k-logistic map. Some of our analysis were carried out in
the generated cyphertext, such as the statistics of the
return times. Others were carried out in the chaotic
source, the k-logistic map. Baptista’s original algorithm
has the number of iterations as the ciphertext, which can
not be directly used for randomness tests based on the
DIEHARD and NIST test suits. These tests were there-
fore performed in the chaotic generator used. More than
trying to create a cryptosystem that can be commercially
exploited, we sought not only to improving the original
approach but also to open a new branch of study for the
chaos-based cryptosystem community.
Some considerations need to be taken into account.
The first point concerns computational cost. In general,
the cost is high for both the ergodic cryptosystem and
our proposed method. However, we must salient that,
once the orbit is calculated, the k-th values of the gen-
erated orbits do not increase the computational cost as
k gets larger, since the performance relies mostly on the
first calculation of the original orbit. Importantly, as k
gets larger the security improves. Another point is that
the original ergodic cryptosystem uses double precision,
which indeed, due to round-off errors it may quickly fall
into a periodic window induced by round-off errors. The
FORTRAN double precision applied in the original chaos
based algorithm guarantees 15 digits of accuracy and a
magnitude ranging of 10 from -308 to +308. We fixed this
issue by using high arbitrary precision arithmetic. A high
precision can be achieved using the high-performance ar-
bitrary precision arithmetic library Apfloat1. It performs
calculations with a precision of millions of digits, provid-
ing true chaotic, and therefore aperiodic orbits.
In the original ergodic cryptosystem, the round-off op-
erations could lead to a non-invertible encryption proce-
dure. This problem is evident in the scenario where the
computer of the message transmitted has greater preci-
sion than the computer of the receiver. The k-logistic
map is implemented over a arbitrary precision arith-
1http://www.apfloat.org/
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metic, then the round-off error can be used in our favor.
For instance, the number of precision can be setup. Obvi-
ously, we should maintain a reasonable precision in order
to guarantee the k-logistic map to produce randomness.
Regarding the conjugacy, the logistic map at µ = 4 is
topologically conjugated to the tent map as well as the
shift map [29]. Due to the fact that these maps have the
same dynamical behavior, there is some possibility to do
inverse engineering. The k-logistic map may also present
this issue. So, we recommended using µ → 4, in order
to avoid conjugacy with tent map or shift map, but still
being able to create a trajectory with higher entropy.
We hope this work will create a challenge for the scien-
tific community, opening new avenues in which research
will be conducted to search for possible deficiencies or
further developments in the proposed improved cryp-
tosystem. For example, attempts to discover patterns in
the proposed PRNG sequences may lead to the appear-
ance of new weaknesses in the proposed cryptosystem,
revealing new possibilities for the field of cryptography.
Scrutiny and new improvements might create after all a
secure cryptographic systems out of the one studied in
this work.
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